Description (CNA)
Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.
Affected (CNA)
| Vendor / product | Versions |
|---|---|
| Light & Wonder, Inc. / SHFL Entertainment, Inc. / Shuffle Master, Inc. / Deck Mate 2 | affected 0 before all known versions prior to 2025-10-23 |
CWE
CWE-321, CWE-327, CWE-347
References
- https://www.ioactive.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IOActive-card-shuffler-security.pdf
- https://www.wired.com/story/card-shuffler-hack/
- https://www.wired.com/story/how-hacked-card-shufflers-allegedly-enabled-a-mob-fueled-poker-scam-that-rocked-the-nba/
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/shuffle-master-deck-mate-2-insecure-update-chain
ADP enrichment
No English description supplied.
No references supplied.