Description (CNA)
Open redirect in pgAdmin 4's multi-factor authentication flow. The MFA validate and register endpoints honoured the user-supplied 'next' query/form parameter without confirming the target pointed back inside pgAdmin, so an authenticated victim who clicked /mfa/validate?next=<external> -- a link typically delivered by phishing -- would be sent to an attacker-controlled host directly out of the trusted auth flow. The defect is a trusted-domain redirect, not a privilege bypass: the attacker gains no read/write access to pgAdmin or the victim's database, but the redirect launders the attacker's destination through pgAdmin's URL, which raises the success rate of credential-phishing follow-on against the victim. Fix introduces a same-origin _is_safe_redirect_url helper and gates every MFA redirect that consumes user-supplied 'next' values through it. The helper allows only relative paths and absolute URLs whose scheme is http(s) and whose host matches the current request host; it rejects external hosts in absolute and protocol-relative form, non-http schemes (javascript:, data:, mailto:), userinfo tricks (http://localhost@attacker/), and backslash variants that some browsers normalize to forward slashes. Unsafe targets fall back to the internal browser index. A dedicated regression test exercises each accept/reject category and the original reporter PoC. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.0 before 9.16.
Affected (CNA)
| Vendor / product | Versions |
|---|---|
| pgadmin.org / pgAdmin 4 | affected 6.0 before 9.16 |
CWE
CWE-601
References
- https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10028
- https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/fff6a481854b07822c2b54e8181e6a9076d204cd
ADP enrichment
No English description supplied.
No references supplied.