Description (CNA)
LiteLLM prior to 1.83.10 allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint. While the endpoint correctly restricts users to updating only their own account, it does not restrict which fields may be changed. A user who can reach this endpoint can set their role to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative access to LiteLLM including all users, teams, keys, models, and prompt history. Users with the org_admin role have legitimate access to this endpoint and can exploit this vulnerability without chaining any additional flaw.
Affected (CNA)
| Vendor / product | Versions |
|---|---|
| BerriAI / litellm | affected 0 before 1.83.10 |
CWE
CWE-863
References
- https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/litellm-privilege-escalation-rce
- https://gist.github.com/13ph03nix/9ec616e1fdc77b3673509c60206e827f
- https://huntr.com/bounties/8e75edfb-ff05-4e63-bfca-2d93d03fb3b9
- https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.10-stable
- https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/25541
- https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/commit/e6f18ce75b111c9b93dc15c72894cbdeb53177ce
- https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/commit/128d32d2494b759c5d15da3452452af4c6a34c01
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/litellm-privilege-escalation-via-user-update
ADP enrichment
No English description supplied.
No references supplied.
A flaw was found in LiteLLM. A user with access to the `/user/update` endpoint can exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability. By modifying their own `user_role` to `proxy_admin`, an attacker can gain full administrative access to LiteLLM, including control over all users, teams, keys, models, and prompt history.