Description (CNA)
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker's shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Affected (CNA)
| Vendor / product | Versions |
|---|---|
| ZcashFoundation / zebra | affected < 4.5.0 |
| ZcashFoundation / zebra-state | affected < 7.0.0 |
CWE
CWE-248
References
- https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6
- https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1440b43ca7df59aca948090d45117557b217a6cd
- https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.5.0
ADP enrichment
No English description supplied.
No references supplied.