Description (CNA)
Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
Affected (CNA)
| Vendor / product | Versions |
|---|---|
| Headroom Labs / Headroom | affected 0 before 0.36.1; unaffected 0.36.1 |
CWE
CWE-639
References
- https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/pull/2207
- https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.29.0/headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py
- https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.36.1/headroom/proxy/identity.py
- https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/headroom-proxy-treats-the-client-supplied-x-headroom-user-id-header-as-an-authenticated-identity
ADP enrichment
No English description supplied.
No references supplied.