Description (CNA)
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data. AshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public. This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25.
Affected (CNA)
| Vendor / product | Versions |
|---|---|
| ash-project / ash_phoenix | affected 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25 |
| ash-project / ash_phoenix | affected 06875682999938f607c970e71b6a80af90e18b3d before a3691a3cb0947e8f2dc2c3cbff138a3e6197a15b |
CWE
CWE-639
References
- https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/security/advisories/GHSA-7xhg-xphm-f458
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82725.html
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82725
- https://github.com/ash-project/ash_phoenix/commit/a3691a3cb0947e8f2dc2c3cbff138a3e6197a15b
ADP enrichment
No English description supplied.