Description (CNA)
Capgo (Cap-go/capgo.app) contains an authentication bypass affecting all versions (no patched version available at time of publication). The Edge authorization path allows a password-only Supabase aal1 session to exercise privileged RBAC permissions even when the account has a verified MFA factor that has not been used for the session: the Edge JWT middleware (foundJWT() in supabase/functions/_backend/utils/hono_middleware.ts) accepts the JWT without validating its assurance level, and the direct RBAC path (checkPermission()/checkPermissionPg() in supabase/functions/_backend/utils/rbac.ts calling public.rbac_check_permission_direct()) authorizes by user ID without passing or checking the session aal, unlike the public.verify_mfa() control which correctly requires aal2. An attacker who knows only the victim's password can therefore authenticate, mint a persistent app-scoped app_admin API key that remains valid after the aal1 session is logged out, and perform privileged operations such as modifying production OTA channel configurations (validated by changing a public production channel from bundle 1.0.0 to 1.0.1), defeating the protection provided by MFA.
Affected (CNA)
| Vendor / product | Versions |
|---|---|
| Cap-go / capgo.app | affected 0 through * |
CWE
CWE-288
References
- https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/security/advisories/GHSA-9435-5xw9-v29h
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/capgo-aal1-session-mfa-bypass-via-direct-rbac-authorization
ADP enrichment
No English description supplied.