Description (CNA)
Capgo (capgo.app) backend through 12.242.4 does not validate parent-child delegation when processing the x-limited-key-id header. checkKeyByIdPg() in supabase/functions/_backend/utils/hono_middleware.ts resolves the attacker-supplied numeric API key ID using only the key ID, its expiration state, and the authenticating key's user_id, while hasLimitedRbacSubkeyScope() accepts any key with a non-organization (e.g., app-scoped) RBAC binding and validateSubkeyUser() only compares owning user IDs. Because Capgo treats API keys as independent RBAC principals with separate role bindings, an authenticated apikey_manager API key with no application access can supply the numeric ID of a more privileged same-owner key and have the middleware replace the authenticated principal and effective API-key secret with that key (setSubkeyAuthContext), exercising an app_admin sibling's permissions without knowing or submitting its secret. The issue was reproduced on release 12.242.4 (commit b3d02cdbc23ac59990785acacd1f113c07458568) after the fix for GHSA-8h52-44r7-w343; at the time of the advisory no patched version was available.
Affected (CNA)
| Vendor / product | Versions |
|---|---|
| Cap-go / capgo.app | affected 0 through 12.242.4 |
CWE
CWE-863
References
- https://github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/security/advisories/GHSA-5hjr-xhx8-x5j7
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/capgo-api-key-manager-authentication-bypass-via-x-limited-key-id
ADP enrichment
No English description supplied.