Description (CNA)
In OpenPanel through 2.3.0, the data importer fetches a caller-supplied URL with plain fetch instead of the project's existing SSRF guard (apps/api/src/utils/safe-fetch.ts). In packages/importer/src/providers/umami.ts, parseRemoteFile calls fetch() on config.fileUrl, which is validated only by z.string().url(), so values such as http://127.0.0.1:9911/ or http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ are accepted; the shared createFileImportConfig factory gives the plausible provider the same field. An authenticated organization member — including a default 'member' with no project_access rows, for whom the intended access-level check is skipped because getProjectAccess returns boolean true rather than a level object — can therefore make the server connect to any address reachable from it. The resulting HTTP status and status text are persisted as Import.errorMessage and returned by import.get to the same user, providing a scanning oracle for internal hosts, ports and paths; if an internal response parses as Umami CSV, its rows are ingested as events and become readable in the attacker's analytics views.
Affected (CNA)
| Vendor / product | Versions |
|---|---|
| Openpanel-dev / openpanel | affected 0 through 2.3.0 |
CWE
CWE-918
References
- https://github.com/Openpanel-dev/openpanel/security/advisories/GHSA-cj2r-3x54-88h7
- https://github.com/Openpanel-dev/openpanel/commit/5faad3226df8fe03bc9434dfd255afb3fcea4c83
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openpanel-ssrf-via-unguarded-importer-file-url-fetch
ADP enrichment
No English description supplied.